The regulations of the 1985 World Chess Championship Match between Karpov and Kasparov included a special clause – should Karpov lose his title, he would be granted a return match.

This clause, confirmed at the FIDE Congress in Graz three days before the start of the 1985 match, became a source of a heated dispute between the two players, USSR Chess Federation and FIDE. A dispute that almost jeopardized the whole 1986 match.

A brief chronology of events that led to 1986 Match Agreement is given below (The summary is based on the Garry Kasparov On Modern Chess: Part Three – Kasparov vs Karpov, 1986-1987, pages 7-14):

·        5th December 1985

Karpov claims his right to a return match. Under the new rules it had to be implemented between 10 February and 21 April 1986 – just within three months after the end of the previous match.

· 22nd December 1985

After the match against Jan Timman in Hilversum, Kasparov holds a press conference in which he spoke openly against the return match:

„This match should not take place, because no one should have so many privileges. The world champion keeps his title in the event of a drawn match, and that is enough. If I lose, I will give up my right to a return match.“

Kasparov was supported by the newly formed European Chess Union, which had written a letter to the USSR Chess Federation suggesting that the return match should be canceled. The letter was signed by Jan Timman and Bent Larsen, among others.

(It has to be said that „giving up his right to return match“ and posing questions such as „What, in general, was the point of granting a world champion the right to a return match?“ is somewhat hypocritical from Kasparov, if we consider how loudly he demanded a return match against Kramnik in the 2000s)

·        4th January 1986

Kasparov asks the USSR Chess Federation to state its position. They replied there is no question return match should happen.

FIDE agrees. Campomanes says the rules require a formal undertaking by 7 January, or Kasparov will be stripped of his title. Later he admits he misread the rules – the contestants had two weeks to confirm their willingness to play, but only after the venue has been announced, which didn’t yet happen.

·        18th January 1986

Kasparov publicly announces he refuses to play the match in February.

·        21st January 1986

USSR Chess Federation calls an urgent session. After lengthy discussions which included Kasparov and Karpov spending time in a separate room, an agreement was signed by the champion, challenger and Vitaly Sevastyanov, the president of the Federation:

• The players agreed to play the return match in July/August 1986.
• In order not to disrupt the course of other FIDE tournaments and the subsequent World Championship Cycle, the loser will play a super-final (a match against the winner of the Candidates) in February 1987
• Next World Championship Match will take place in July/August 1987

·        February 1986

Kasparov and Karpov travel to Luzerne to FIDE headquarters to secure the acceptance of our agreement and to decide on the match venue. In Luzerne, it was confirmed the match would start on 28 July 1986. First 12 games would be played in London and the second 12 games in Leningrad.

Thus, finally, on 28 July the players sat across each other in the Park Lane Hotel’s Grand Ballroom and the match begun.

After the first three draws, Kasparov stroke first in the 4th game, once again in the 4 Nf3 Nimzo-Indian that gave his opponent headache in the previous match. Karpov stroke immediately in the 5th game in which he exploited an analytical mistake by Kasparov’s team in a sharp 4 Bf4 Grünfeld.

However, starting from the 8th game, Kasparov gained the initiative in the match. In a wild attacking game, Karpov committed the crucial mistake on move 29 and lost on time just two moves later (in a lost position though). This game was a major psychological turning point. Kasparov (Garry Kasparov On Modern Chess: Part Three – Kasparov vs Karpov, 1986-1987, page 87):

„It is hard to over-estimate the psychological significance of the 8th game for the entire subsequent struggle. It was a defining moment: in contrast to earlier times, Karpov was unable to punish me for my audacious, provocatively sharp play“

After 12 games, the match moved to Leningrad. Kasparov switched to 1 e4 with the White pieces, and he managed to breach Karpov’s defences in the Spanish opening in games 14 and 16.

The game 16 was particularly fascinating.  Kasparov’s pieces were hovering all around the chessboard, leaving themselves en prise in the process and sacrificing themselves, doing everything to get at the Black king. After Karpov took the ill-knight on a3, Kasparov’s attack became unstoppable and on move 41, Karpov resigned the game.

So, Kasparov took the +3 lead and everyone thought the match was over. However, as we have already learnt from Karpov – Korchnoi Baguio City encounter and first Kasparov-Karpov match, a huge lead in a match is a definite psychological burden. After the 16th game, something unprecedented happened – Kasparov lost games 17, 18 and 19 and suddenly, the score was leveled.

By Kasparov’s own admission, he should have taken his last time out after game 16 (Garry Kasparov On Modern Chess: Part Three – Kasparov vs Karpov, 1986-1987, page 163):

„ In a similar situation after my win in the 14th game I took a time-out and managed to prepare successfully (mainly emotionally) for the next two encounters. But at this moment, not wishing immediately to make use of my last break, I refrained from such a sensible step.“

In this critical situation, Kasparov suffered another blow. Unexpectedly, Evgeny Vladimirov, one of his seconds who has been a part of his team for five years, decided to leave the team. Although he never explained his decision, there is a lot of suspicions he did so because he was secretly sending Kasparov’s analysis to Karpov. The reasons for suspicion are given below: (The summary is based on the Garry Kasparov On Modern Chess: Part Three – Kasparov vs Karpov, 1986-1987, pages 197-201):

• Karpov seemed excellently prepared throughout the whole match
• Karpov not only avoided Kasparov’s novelties, but also played inferior moves Kasparov’s team considered as the strongest at a time
• Vladimirov has been making copies of the joint opening analysis without Kasparov’s knowledge
• Vladimirov almost always went for a run before the games in London
• There is evidence Karpov analyzed the position that appeared in the 18th game in great detail the day before
• After the 18th game, everyone in Kasparov’s team agreed no one would leave the camp and Vladimirov refused to comply
• After Vladimirov left, Karpov suddenly took time out, explaining he developed „opening problems“

Anyway, in the 20th game, Kasparov played a safe Catalan and easily drew. In the 21st game, he defended a slightly inferior position and then came the 22nd game. In a seemingly equal position, he found a fantastic, study-like solution, that effectively won the match.

In the remaining two games, Karpov never came close to winning. With the +1 score, Kasparov managed to beat Karpov again and to defend his title.

Alas, this was not the end of his battles against Karpov – as it turned out, in less than a year he would have to face him again…

SOURCES:

Garry Kasparov On Modern Chess: Part Three – Kasparov vs Karpov, 1986-1987

Mark Weeks Chess: Kasparov – Karpov, 1986

Chessgames: Kasparov vs Karpov, 1986